

II - From Phenomenology to Explanation

Modern science is empirical, systematic, explanatory, factual, methodical and social. A mature science has a core model or set of models, or more generally, paradigms, that are accepted by the particular scientific community as the context for explanation and research. The model can be replaced, but when it is, it is by another model that also gains social acceptance by the professional community. A particular philosophy could also claim to be empirical, systematic, explanatory, factual and methodical. But it would not be a science in the modern sense since it would not be accepted by the full philosophical community. The best it could claim is that it is a science just as chemistry was an incipient science at the time “scientific chemical” explanations competed for acceptance with alchemy. For a scientific philosophy, then, the issue becomes one of a claim versus achievement. This is not to say that philosophers are not social. There are schools and historical traditions. But it is to say that there is not a common set of paradigms accepted by the philosophical community.

Though it may seem presumptuous to claim that philosophy is scientific, it is less difficult to claim that philosophy and science are complementary. There are the historical origins of the sciences from natural philosophy. But in addition to contributing to the sciences in their genesis as they differentiated themselves from philosophy, philosophy has some contribution to make to the understanding of scientific method and to the common objects of both. This clearly is the case in the understanding of consciousness. We live in a time of a remarkable convergence of technology, the natural and human

sciences, and philosophy towards understanding the human mind, consciousness, knowing and knowledge.

Philosophy is complementary to science . As factual it can make a real contribution to the development of methods and models. Just as a true philosophy of science needs to be compatible with scientific development, so science needs to be attuned to facts discovered by philosophy. What kind of facts are we considering here? In this chapter we will provide some examples by understanding the relation of judgment and truth in terms of existential explanation. This will permit us to understand how the science of consciousness is explanatory and provide an initial understanding of the complementarity of philosophy and science.

As we progress we will see that philosophy plays heuristic, integrative and constitutive roles in the developing science of mind and consciousness. These can only be understood and performed effectively if the context, or orientation and horizon, of the effort is understood. This requires an understanding of facts, objectivity and explanation. It also requires a reorientation of phenomenological and existential concerns towards an explanatory viewpoint and a horizon that transcends consciousness, or, in their terms, temporality. I make the latter claim not only because the contributions of these movements, though immense, fall short of an adequate notion of objectivity, but because they set up and address the problematic of understanding how lived experience can be understood within a scientific context. Resolution of this issue will enable us to understand the role of hermeneutics in an explanatory human science.

We will address these issues initially through an historical approach to understanding judgment and truth while addressing the question “Is knowledge of

consciousness privileged?” That is, since consciousness is immediately given, can a science of consciousness be certain in contrast to the natural sciences where theories are merely probable and some of the objects or their characteristics are not given?

We will consider two paths of philosophical development which yielded the two most comprehensive views of the science of consciousness in the Twentieth Century. The first is the phenomenological where we will illustrate the transformation from Kant’s notion of the correspondence theory of truth to the notion of certainty as self evidence in Husserl and its transformation in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. The transition from Kant to Husserl is via Brentano. We also will briefly note Dilthey’s notion of the immediacy of the truth of facts of consciousness. Though his notions of conscious operations are not as sophisticated as Husserl’s he does lay out the fundamental issue in understanding whether and how knowledge of consciousness is somehow privileged. The second path is from Newman to Lonergan with respect to the notion of judgment and truth.

Via the discussion of truth we will be able to understand more clearly the extent of knowledge of the thing-in-itself. The question of truth regards the possibility of knowing anything at all and the relationship of thinking to being, while that of the thing in itself regards knowing things as they are rather than as they appear. This does not mean that knowledge of appearances is false, but that as knowledge of things it is incomplete. Is there something about human knowledge in general that makes it incomplete in principle? For Kant there was. We cannot have an intellectual intuition of things in themselves. What this means and why it is a limitation for him we will leave for later. Phenomenology resolves the issue by collapsing the distinction of the thing in itself and the thing for us to the thing for us. This leads to issues with idealism and the problematic of reconciling the life world

within an explanatory view. By understanding knowledge of consciousness as factual and explanatory we will show that knowledge based on sense and on conscious experience can be equally problematic so that it is not the case that knowledge of consciousness is in some way privileged as a surer way to certainty or truth.

Kant and Brentano: Truth

Turning to truth, Kant recognized that there cannot be a universal and sufficient criterion of truth. He recognizes truth as the agreement of thought with its object. This is a form of the correspondence theory of truth where thought corresponds with reality. He notes that "...a universal criterion of truth would be one that is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of their objects." But truth is in the relation of the content of cognition to its object. One thrust of this argument is that truths are particular and as particular one needs to "apply" the universal criterion to the particular content. In that application we are not relying exclusively on the universal, and it is in that application that truth is found.¹ He particularizes this argument further by considering logic, which for him deals with the form of thought. (This is in contrast to symbolic logic, developed after Kant, where logical truth does not need to be linked to the form of thought but can be found in the logical system as formal truth, much as mathematical truths are within mathematics.) Even though for him truth must follow the "universal and necessary rules of understanding" these are not sufficient to determine if the content is true. Again, it is necessary, but not sufficient.

¹ Kant, Critique, page 112

To move beyond the formal for Kant we need a sensible intuition. Concepts allow us to think the object, but objects are given in intuition. Cognition, as distinct from thought, requires both. ²(p. 187)

The limitation of logic and the universal as rule appears again in Kant's theory of judgment. "...(J)udgment is the ability to *subsume* under rules." It is the application of the concepts as rules. It cannot be taught but must be learned in practice. It is a natural talent reliant on "mother wit". ³(p 206) It is subject to error or misuse from two sources. One can

"...have insight into the universal *in abstracto* but is unable to distinguish whether a case *in concreto* belongs under it; or again he may blunder because he has not been sufficiently trained for this judgment through examples and actual tasks." (p. 207)⁴

Thus, there are no rules that are sufficient for applying rules since any such rule, being universal, would itself need to be applied and could be misapplied. (p. 206)⁵

A similar point has been made by such disparate philosophers as Wittgenstein and Polanyi who both note that there are no rules for applying rules. The indeterminacy in the application of rules or universals provides a challenge to be met by the person. This raises two questions. The first is the psychological one. How do we do this? The second is epistemological. If judgment is personal, is truth merely subjective? That is, do we each

² Kant, Critique, page 187

³ Critique p. 206

⁴ Critique p. 207

⁵ Critique p. 206

have our own truths which may be both contrary and legitimate? Is truth merely interpretation?

These are standard questions in the history of philosophy. There are no standard conclusive answers that philosophers agree on. But there are ebbs and flows of development that advance the discussion and lead to significant development. Brentano contributed at least four major interrelated elements that address these issues and that contributed to Husserl's breakthrough into phenomenology. The first is relatively minor in terms of the effort it takes to understand it, but it is significant in its subsequent impact in the development of phenomenology and existentialism. It is his critique of the correspondence theory of truth complemented by his notion of truth as evident. The second is his resurrection of the scholastic notion of intentionality. The third is his situating of cognitive and other key psychological operations in general within consciousness. The fourth is his view that psychology requires a descriptive foundation. The fourth and the first points join these items in a complex set of relationships since the descriptive foundation is, in some sense, evident. This was refined in Husserl's notion of the immanent.

As we noted above, the correspondence theory of truth claims that truth is found in the relation of thinking to being where thinking corresponds with being. Brentano's critique of the correspondence theory rests on his understanding of it as comparing thinking with being. If there is a comparison, then somehow we must know the truth beforehand, otherwise we would not know that there was no correspondence. He rightly claims that knowing the truth is not a comparison of some reality somehow known beforehand with our thinking. This critique is repeated by Husserl and Heidegger and the same form of argument is used by Husserl in his resolution of the issue of the thing in itself. But this does

not refute the correspondence theory of truth if we do not think of the understanding of truth as correspondence requiring a comparison. How to think the relationship is an issue we will defer until we can handle it adequately. But the real contribution of this critique is his view of the true as evident, which is an opening into the notion of intentionality.

For Brentano, the correspondence theory implies that there must be two judgments. The first is the judgment proper that constitutes knowledge of something. The second is a comparative judgment which compares the first to what is known. But for Brentano the second judgment is both absurd and unnecessary. It is absurd because what is known is known in the first judgment. Likewise it is unnecessary since the “...real guarantee of the truth of a judgment lies in the judgment’s being evident; if a judgment is evident, then either it is directly evident or it is evident as a result of a proof connecting it with other judgments which are directly evident.” As directly evident it is given immediately and “...is a matter of a simple and evident apprehension.”⁶

A first item to note is that we have immediate and mediated judgments. As we shall see, an analogous relationship appears in Husserl in his distinction between immanence and transcendence. Second, the notion of the evident does not imply a naive realism where the real is what is immediately given to me via experience. Rather the evident is given via an apprehension. The apprehension is an insight (Einsicht) which provides “the clarity and evidence of certain judgments which is inseparable from their truth.” (p. 54)⁷ Thus the evident is certain and true.

Whereas Kant acknowledged that there is no necessary and sufficient definition of the truth since truth resides in the correspondence of thought with its particular object,

⁶ Brentano

⁷ Brentano, pages 53 - 54

Brentano can associate truth with a type of conscious activity which immediately yields the 'content' or the evident via insight. The generality that Kant knew he could not find adequately in rules since they need to be applied, Brentano finds in the operation of judging itself not as the application of rules, but as the coming to be of truth for us. Thus, it is by performing the same activity that individuals come to common particular truths, which as true for all attain absoluteness.

But it is true that anything that is seen to be evident by one person is certain, not only for him, but also for anyone else who sees it in a similar way....anyone who thus sees into something as true is also able to see that he is justified in regarding it as true for all. (p. 55)⁸

For Brentano the evident judgment is certain. There are two types of unmediated evident judgment and two corresponding types of mediated judgment. The first are truths of reason, such as the principle of non-contradiction, which are apprehended via insight. The corresponding mediated judgments are logical where we start with axioms or propositions we know to be true and deduce consequences which are judged to be true via their logical relations to the axioms or first principles. The second are factual. They are based on direct empirical evidence.

Brentano criticizes Descartes for not recognizing that direct truths of reason and directly evident empirical truths are similar. The question is why does Brentano equate the directly evident logical truth, a truth of reason, with the directly evident certain factual judgment? Let us turn to the cogito ergo sum of Descartes. One may argue that Descartes

begs the question in deducing his existence from the act of thinking. But the compelling nature of the argument rests on the direct experience of thinking and the inability of thinking to legitimately deny itself. It is, in a sense, evident. As evident it provides evidence yielding an evident judgment. We have evident used in three ways here. I cannot find where Brentano distinguished these senses of evident, but I think their blending contributes to his notion of truth as evident and the consequent emphasis on the understanding of consciousness in his thought and in phenomenology as descriptive. We will deal with this when we consider the relation of description and explanation. The three senses are the evident as experience, the evident as evidence and the evident as what is affirmed. Thus, “I am” is evident based on the evidence of my direct, or evident, experience of my thinking. But there is something deeper going on here based on the nature of the experience. In some sense I can claim that I have a direct experience of a tree but I have some room for doubt here. I can be hallucinating for example. But with the case of thinking in the broad sense, I cannot think I am not thinking because it is apparent that I am. This is not necessarily true, but the point is that the type of experience, where it is somehow apparent to itself, belies the attempt to deny it. When we make the judgment we recognize that we cannot deny we are thinking and be consistent. There is a type of consistency and necessity here which is not pure logical necessity. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.

If we turn to the principle of non-contradiction we enter a similar type of conflict if we try to deny it because it is either true or it is not. The principle of non-contradiction is expressed in two general equivalent forms: “A or not A” and “not (A and not A)”. Thus, if we accept the principle of non-contradiction as true, then, by the principle itself, it cannot be false. It is self-justifying in a sense. If we consider it to be false, then it can be both false

⁸ Brentano p. 55

and true. But as false and true it would not be the principle of non-contradiction. Now the fact is that people violate the principle of non-contradiction all the time in practice. In other words, it is common to think inconsistently. So it would be a misnomer to consider it a law of thought though we can certainly argue that there is a natural tendency towards consistency despite its inconsistent attainment. But there is a sense in which it is self evident, or evident in itself. This type of “self evidence” is logical necessity, but it needs to be understood. There is a sense in which its understanding is its affirmation. But this too requires further differentiation which Brentano does not provide.

We have discussed two instances of “self evidence” with respect to truth. One involving a type of experience and the fact that the denial of it is an affirmation of it and the other involving a similar argument with respect to a logical principle. But there is another sense which grounds phenomenology. It is the self evidence of immanent experience.

The first approximation to immanent experience is to recognize that even though my representation of an object in my imagination may not be accurate, or may be false, my consciousness of my imagination is not. There is an immediacy to conscious experience which for some philosophers guarantees its absoluteness. Thus, Dilthey’s principle of phenomenality claims a realm of immediate reality for the facts of consciousness. The distinction of appearance and reality that we can make with respect to the objects of sensations cannot be made for conscious experience per se. It is to this realm of immanence that Husserl’s various reductions take us.

Husserl: Immanence and the Transcendent

Husserl's phenomenology is a descriptive science of essences. At a first approximation it is descriptive because it is an understanding of the essences of immanent experiences. Immanent experience is fully given and immediate. It is contrasted with the transcendent which is constituted via immanent experiences and is synthetic. The transcendent is present in its absence since it is intended but not fully given. The transcendental, as immanent operations, is fully present. The transcendental ego is an exception, not being fully given.

These relations are exemplified in Husserl's analysis of perception and his notion of the thing. When we perceive a thing, we perceive it via perspectives. We never have a single perception which provides the thing as a whole. Rather the thing for us is a unity which partially is an X which can be understood and dealt with from new perspectives. As a unity it is constituted, or synthesized from immanent experiences of it. As intended it has an open horizon for interaction. This is the core of Merleau-Ponty's later notion of the primacy of perception as opening an horizon of possibility for an ecstatic freedom.

The immanent experiences are the individual perspectives which are not given perspectivally. Each perspective is given all at once. As such, they are immediate and given, self-evident and indubitable. The self evidence is in the manner of a self-giving, indubitable evidence. In this sense, it is an absolute, something which can be used as a ground for judgment.

Phenomenology is an understanding of these experiences through insights which yield their essence. The fundamental insights are of the universal and necessary. In our understanding of the immanent operations constituting the thing, we grasp the necessity of the thing being given perspectivally, the necessity of it being transcendent, the

necessity of it being synthetic and the necessity of it having an open horizon. However, this does not establish its universality, the fact that all possible perceiving must be this way. That is established through imaginative eidetic variation, where all possible types of perceptions are imagined.

This is not an instantaneous process. There are emerging grades of clarity as understanding progresses. When understanding is perfectly clear, when there are no remaining obscurities, then we have it. The essence is self given in an eidetic intuition. We grasp the necessity of all possible perceiving being perspectival. We have the essence of a transcendental operation, a transcendental essence. It is descriptive because it presents how operations are performed and it is of an immanent experience. The transcendent, on the other hand, cannot be fully described because it is not fully given.

The essence is also absolute and is known with certainty. Its absoluteness has at least two sources. First, it has a type of self subsistent existence. Just as mathematical relationships and geometrical theorems exist independently of the psychological state of the knower and follow their own internal logic, which indicates they are not mental creations, phenomenological essences exhibit an internal necessity and an independence of the minds that intuit them. The latter point is established by considering that essences, as universal, exhibit an independence of the individual, particular and contingent. For Husserl, they can exist even if the particulars of which they are the essence do not. Phenomenology, then, as an essential science is an *a priori* science. The second meaning of absolute is that the immediate phenomenological essences can be used as primordial grounds, or evidence, for judgments. In turn, this relates to their certainty.

To understand how eidetic insight is certain, or apodictic, we need to understand the role of the reductions or epochés.

The development of phenomenology has two aspects: establishing that essences exist in themselves and are not psychological constructs, and the reductions⁹. The former is established in the **Logical Investigations** which argues against a psychologism that would explain essences as products of consciousness, or the psyche, and for the absoluteness of essences. The reductions were implicitly and imperfectly performed at that time and became objectified and maturely performed in **Ideas**. Refinements and restatements were made throughout Husserl's later works.

The epoches, or reductions, are shifts in attention, interest and questioning from within the horizons of the natural attitude (the everyday world in which we find ourselves), the factual sciences and the other eidetic sciences (geometry, mathematics, logic). The shift includes suspension of judgments regarding the factuality or truth of the things and events correlative to these attitudes. Our intent in performing the phenomenological reductions is to shift our focus to the experiential or phenomenal without presuppositions. This enables us to attend to the immediately self given, empirically intuited pure experience from which we can intuit the corresponding self-given (self evident) pure essence.

The “unconcern” with factuality has a two-fold purpose. The first is that our concern is not with the particular, contingent and factual, but with the essential. This does not mean that we are not interested in the particular. We are interested in understanding it. Yet that understanding is not of it as factual, but as essence. We use the experience of particulars to understand the essence that applies to all. Husserl's

emphasis on imaginative variation to establish the universal rather than on experience to verify fact bears this out. Thus, phenomenology does not yield knowledge of conscious operations as one set of facts within a pregiven world of other facts. This is the position of psychology. Rather, phenomenology focuses on the essential to establish the *a priori* possibilities of operations, establishing the universal and necessary conditions for all possible worlds, replacing the Kantian emphasis on categories with a descriptive essential science of consciousness. As geometry stands to natural science, so phenomenology would stand to all factual knowledge.

The second is that we are not engaged in the concerns of these attitudes, which has a three fold effect. The first is that we carry no presuppositions regarding facts into our inquiry. The second is that the factual, indeed, everything that has been suspended, remains available, but in a different way. It is available immanently as consciously intended, that is, as a correlate of conscious operations. The possibility of these suspensions rests on the essence of intentionality. Third, conscious operations become explicitly available with their correlates as a new field of experience and inquiry, as phenomena. This shift from the factual, especially the natural standpoint of everyday life, to the immanent can be disorienting. The shift to concern with essences and the ideal adds an additional sense of what Husserl terms the unreal to the project.

As noted, the shift in focus to the experiential, or phenomenal, without presuppositions enables us to attend to the immediately self given, empirically intuited pure experience from which we can intuit the corresponding self-given (self evident) pure essence. The pure, presuppositionless, self-given immediacy is the last link in understanding the essential possibility of truth of eidetic insight, which is not the mere

⁹ Ideas , p. 164

truth of fact, but apodictic truth, universal and necessary. The operations cannot be otherwise and the possible horizons of consciousness are fundamentally grounded and secured.

The reduction is meant to be a permanent achievement, becoming an habitual orientation, a personal transformation that opens up a broader and deeper horizon for inquiry and living. It is primarily a philosophical differentiation of consciousness. The failure of philosophers to gain the pure phenomenal experience and to understand how it grounds all apophantic truth (truth of statements) is, for Husserl, the source of many philosophical mistakes and paradoxes.

The major one is naturalism, which attempts to provide a causal account of consciousness and knowing, reducing them ultimately to the explanations of physics and chemistry. Proponents start from a world of facts, using them as absolute grounds for judgment when they in fact are relative to consciousness and to the more fundamental grounds of immanence. In this way, they overlook the fact that their theory is only possible on the basis of an absolute that they wish to relativize by reducing it to the absolutes of physics and chemistry. In effect, they have implicitly performed a *reductio ad absurdum* by eliminating the grounds for asserting the truth of their theory.

Husserl differentiates being into two types, absolute and relative. The immanent as immediate and self given, and the essences thereof, are absolute, while the transcendent and mediate is relative. The relative can be explained legitimately in terms of the absolute, but the reverse does not hold. Thus, naturalism, in Husserl's framework, is philosophically naive and mistaken from the start.

Starting from facts, even if they are true, provides naturalism with a less secure foundation. It is possible that the facts could be otherwise. As factual, there is nothing to guarantee that the understanding is correct. In addition, experience of the transcendent can be illusory. The transcendent, then, is dubitable in principle. However, the experience of an illusion is not an illusion. It is given immediately as it is and can be understood as essentially different from transcendental experience of the real even though it can carry with it the conviction of truth. One sees repeated here the core of the Cartesian claim regarding the indubitability of the experience of doubting. We can sum up the *apodictic* nature of phenomenology by noting that if we are presuppositionlessly focused on understanding immanent, or fully given, experience and our understanding is complete, it will be indubitable. As intuited, it will be given as it is, being self evident and immediate. (NB: Discussion in **Insight** that if the image is correct, the understanding will be correct. The error is not in the understanding, but in the image. p. 431 - 432)

This explains why the epoches are reductions. The transcendent is reduced to the immanent, not to change its status, or eliminate it as truly real, but to reveal its essence. Thus, phenomenology is a new type of formal science. It is not a deductive rationalism, mathematics or logic. Rather it grasps transcendental essences in their essential interrelationships as these are presaged in empirical intuition and self given in eidetic intuition. By opening up the phenomenal as the legitimate field for philosophy, all regions of being can be philosophically understood in a new way and in a new context, but with the Aristotelian criteria for a science as universally and necessarily true intact, with the demands of radical questioning met, and with doubt eliminated.

Husserl: Judgment and Truth

Whereas for Kant there was no universal and necessary definition of truth, for Husserl, certainty in understanding transcendental consciousness is based on the universality and necessity of eidetic intuition.

Judgment for Husserl is related to doxic modes, or what we may call degrees of commitment to, or belief in the reality of the judged. For example, we have varying degrees of doubt which can be understood in relation to our experiences of certainty. Judgment, however, is secondary to primordial intuitive dator and eidetic givenness, since these provide the ultimate evidence for judgment. Judgment also seems to retain the synthetic role it has in most philosophies since its content, as propositional, is pre-given, and the proposition is relational, attributive, implicational, and so on. For Husserl, what is most real is given prior to judgment and is overlooked in the natural attitude, the factual and formal sciences and so on.

With the notion of truth as immediate and as coincidental with the self-givenness of immanent conscious correlates, the notion of truth as the correspondence of knowing with being in judgment appears derivative and limited. It assumes that two elements which already are pre-given, the proposition and the reality to which it must correspond, must be related to one another. The truth of the relation is founded on the pre-given elements, which in fact constitute the evidence and point to the more primordial truth which constitutes the horizon for judgment. Truth as correspondence, for Husserl, is understood within the natural standpoint which naively assumes the independent reality

of the world and the things in it. Husserl gives Brentano's argument against the correspondence theory of truth a Phenomenological context.

The self-givenness is self-evidence. In phenomenological terminology truth is fulfillment of intentional operations achieved via the various intuitions. The immediacy of fulfillment does not mean that fulfillment is gained immediately. The fulfillment of eidetic intuition is gained after much effort as is understanding the meaning of various expressions.

We have focused on eidetic intuition because it is what grounds a science of consciousness for Husserl. The range of truth is broader than that. In the Logical Investigations¹⁰ being is "...the identity of the object at once meant and given in adequation...as the adequately perceivable thing as such, in an indefinite relation to an intention that is to make true or fulfill adequately." Actuality, then, is a correlate of a true intending where something is adequately self-given. In the later Husserl of Experience and Judgement he reiterates this understanding in a richer context by explicitly taking into account the situational aspect of truth in the indeterminate anticipation of a state of affairs. Just as the perceived thing in Ideas is only given perspectively, so a state of affairs is never fully given.

It has its self-evidence, its truth; this means, however, that it is given at first hand as provisional, as an indeterminate truth....Just as the underlying perception can never be adequate, just as it never contains the thing itself but only the sense of the thing, fulfilling itself as continually changing and expanding, so also *the judgment of perception never contains* the state of

affairs itself. ...No truly existing state of affairs, relative to a transcendent real thing, is given “adequately”; or again: in no judgment of experience, be it ever so saturated with experience, can the act of judgment bear in itself what is true, the state of affairs itself. ¹¹

So we have the absolute being of consciousness, given fully or adequately, and known with certainty contrasted with the intrinsic indeterminacy of the transcendent and situational. But we also have within the situational a range of intentions and correspondingly, multivariate fulfillments. Given this, we can rapidly transition to the early Heidegger’s notion of truth as the freedom of consciousness and dasein as the primary locus for the inquiry into being.

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty: Truth

For Heidegger Being as such, though, is not self-given. Being appears. Being manifests itself. But in this disclosure it also is concealed. Truth as transcending is an open ended freedom of consciousness. As Husserl is analytic in his differentiation of conscious operations in their constitutive functions, Heidegger is synthetic in his emphasis on equiprimordiality, the unity of intentionality in care and in his notion of truth. Heidegger focuses more on the person as a whole, as existence. His existential analytic always proceeds in reference to the whole that is explicated. It is when we lose sight of the whole that dasein becomes a thing within the world and is understood

¹⁰ Husserl, LI p. 768

¹¹ Husserl, Experience and Judgement, p. 288.

inauthentically. So while Husserl located the issue of the meaning of being within an understanding of consciousness, Heidegger goes a step further. Being in the strongest sense is not commensurate with the self-given. Rather its meaning is somehow imbedded in our pre-ontological understanding of being which we must have if we are to know anything at all. It is explicating the meaning of that understanding which is fundamental ontology. Thus, consciousness is not transparent to itself. Rather, it is problematic to itself as meaningful and this meaning which is at the core of our existence is opaque. This meaning is precisely what is not given. The science of phenomenology is supplemented by a hermeneutics. More importantly, by trying to understand being by understanding immanence, or pure presence, one is missing the point. Thus, data of consciousness are important, but they are not privileged in any sense. Rather than leading us to being, their investigation can hinder the disclosure of being.

Heidegger shifts from immanence to being. Phenomenology as science of the immanent can be perceived as a form of falling, a concealing of being in an emphasis on beings. With the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity and the correlation of authenticity with being in the truth, truth becomes correlative with a way of being. In our discussion of Brentano we noted that there was a generalization to the notion of truth via operations, specifically judgment. With Heidegger the generalization extends to the whole of consciousness, to being-in-the-world as such. Not only does it extend to the whole of consciousness, but there also is the possibility of not being in the truth, or inauthenticity. Though Heidegger may not have put it this way, there is a normativity of being true which permits a critique or evaluation of the mode of being of *dasein*. This is not necessarily an ethical valuation since we are concerned at this point only with the

self-transcendence towards being. Rather it is a performative, or, more generally, an operational evaluation. What this means explanatorily we will discuss later. (This conforms to the fact that Heidegger did not do an ethics. Rather than this being a criticism, it indicates that Heidegger's concern was with being as such).

Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, argues against a science of immanence on principle. For him, there is an irreducibly opaque tacit cogito that at best can be made explicit after the fact. Even when made explicit it remains in a situation, a field which is not transparent to it, but ambiguous. He notes:

The ideas of a form of consciousness which is transparent to itself, its existence being identifiable with its awareness of existing, is not so very different from the notion of the unconscious; in both cases we have the same retrospective illusion, since there is, introduced into me as an explicit object, everything that I am later to learn concerning myself.¹²

His argument is that we are literally putting ourselves at the end of time, that is, in a sense we are attempting to jump out of our temporality. There is a projection of us as totally known. But there is no absolute standpoint beyond temporality that we can attain. Moreover, we are not known primordially via objective, or positing thought, rather we need to be, in some sense, revealed. Our thinking of ourselves presupposes our existence which is not commensurate with our thinking. Thus, "...ultimate subjectivity cannot

¹² Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, pages 380-381

think of itself the moment it exists...”¹³ What this means is that the “subject” and the “world” are on the same footing. With Heidegger he can say

In short, we experience a participation in the world, and ‘being-in-truth’ is indistinguishable from being-in-the-world.¹⁴

The implications for a science of consciousness is that the phenomena of consciousness are no more privileged than those of the world. Just as we progressively make the world more explicit, so we become more explicit for ourselves. Just as we live in situations which are opaque and ambiguous, our experience of consciousness is just of one area of this experiential field and possesses the same qualities.

Part of the reason for this is his distinction of the tacit and explicit which has significant parallels with Polanyi’s. He uses the example of language, which, if made explicit in its functioning loses its function as language. The effectiveness of language lies in its capacity for communication and expression without being attended to. Language is like a tool and the analysis is similar to Heidegger’s of the ready-to-hand.

Now there are two threads running through his arguments. The first is the ambiguity of what we know since it shades off into relations and implications yet to be discovered and emerges from prior understanding and knowledge that we may not be able to explicate. The second is that we are active before we know what we are doing, and there always is an active residue, even if we make the activity explicit. To put it more precisely, as in the case of language, even as we make it explicit. Before we deal with the

¹³ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, page 404.

¹⁴ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, page 395.

implications of these issues for a science of mind, let us turn to another developmental path exemplified by the transition from Newman's grammar of assent to Lonergan's notion of judgments of fact.

Newman and Assent

Newman considers his account of assent, or judgment, to be based on psychological facts. At the center of his model is the proposition. "Propositions (consisting of a subject and predicate unity by the copula) may take a categorical, conditional, or interrogative form."¹⁵ The interrogative is a question, the conditional an inference and the categorical an assertion. They develop sequentially. "A proposition, which starts with being a Question, may become a Conclusion, and then be changed into an Assertion...."¹⁶ Corresponding to these are the acts of doubt, inference and assent. These in turn correspond to states of mind: doubt to skepticism, inference to conditional acceptance or consideration of the proposition as possible or likely and assent to unconditional acceptance.

This fairly neat and concise schema is most easily understood in complex assent where the elements are conceptualized via language. However the most common reasoning for Newman is natural inference where the process is tacit, or in his terms, unconscious and implicit, and the mediating role of language may not take place or is not apparent. We seem to grasp the truth fairly directly without being able to explicate the steps we took to attain it or to be able to fully justify our judgment. Just as we saw with

¹⁵ Newman, Grammar of Assent, page 25

Kant who appealed to mother wit and talent to account for one person having better judgment than another, Newman similarly develops his theory of the illative sense. At times, it is a "...perception of facts without assignable media of perceiving...Presence of mind, fathoming of motives, talent for repartee, are instances of this gift."¹⁷ He provides an example of a physician who can make a correct diagnosis, but may not be able to fully defend it to another physician.¹⁸ In general it is the power of reasoning and judgment. In the cases of simple assent above, it appears almost instinctual. In complex assent, the process is more prolonged and typically requires the mediation of language. It is more likely that we can outline our arguments and trace our psychological activities in these cases.

Though the illative sense relies on natural abilities, it develops through knowledge.¹⁹ One can be wise in philosophy and not physics, know how to fix cars but not do plumbing. In this sense, we are self made and self regulating. We cannot appeal to anything outside the immanent criteria for judgment since we would need some such criteria to accept it.

Lastly, the illative sense regards the concrete, the real and factual, versus the notional. First, it does not proceed via abstract rules alone. To assent to a proposition we need to have some understanding of it. In contrast, we do not need to understand the terms to make an inference, though the inference is valid. "...we can infer, if "x is y, and y is z, that x is z," whether we know the meaning of x and z or no."²⁰ But neither is mere understanding enough for assent. The understood per se is merely notional. It is

¹⁶ Newman, Grammar of Assent, page 25.

¹⁷ Newman, Grammar of Assent, page 263

¹⁸ Newman, Grammar of Assent, page 261.

¹⁹ Newman, Grammar of Assent, page 274.

opinion, a likelihood, a possibility. It is assent that crosses and closes the gap from possibility for us to reality for us with reliance on our illative sense. Each assent in turn contributes to the development of that sense. Concomitantly, with each assent there is an addition to reality for us, a reality correlative to our illative sense.

There are some similarities in Newman to the preceding philosophers. We already have noted the similarity with Kant, that the power of judgment is personal. There is a similarity with Brentano in that the inquiry into truth relies on an inquiry into judgment as activity. There is an incipient view of intentionality with the correlation of activities, stages of a proposition, states of mind and the corresponding status of the reality of the proposition's reference or content. There also is a correlation with Brentano and Husserl in the emphasis on an empirical inquiry into mind, though we should not go so far as to equate Newman's psychological inquiry with the transcendental sweep of Husserl's phenomenology. Finally, there is a similarity in Newman's account of simple assent and the illative sense with the tacit cogito of Merleau-Ponty. There also is the difficulty of justifying our knowledge in many cases due to the complexity of the contributions to it.

But there are two items that are different in Newman. The first is that there is a pattern of activities as one proceeds from questions or doubt to inference and from inference to assent. The second is that judgment is not a synthesis, nor an act of understanding, but an assent. By assent, it can be either an unconditional yes or an unconditional no. Prior to assent, something may or may not be known. Afterward it is. Now assent is fallible, so perhaps we should claim that after assent it is for us, though it may not be in reality. However, we do know we make errors and we correct them. So

²⁰ Newman, Grammar of Assent, page 29.

there can be a difference between what we know, in the sense of what we claim after the process we go through to assent unconditionally, and what is real. It is discovery of that gap in fact which is the discovery of truth and error. It is in the correction of error that we recover the correspondence, or relation, of knowledge to reality that is truth. If this is so, then we can have a correspondence theory of truth which does not beg the question of reality. We are not claiming that there is a correspondence between something that is somehow given which is real and our thought and knowledge. Rather we are claiming that when what is known is real, knowledge is true. There is an identity. The identity is intentional. What we are intending as so, is so. The identity of the known and the real is known not by comparing two realities, but by comparing truth and error. Thus, the real is for us in the fullest sense when we assent. It is because we are fallible that we have an issue with truth.

Now this issue also is set for us in another way when we are considering whether or not something is true. There is a gap between what we think and the real. But we do not close that gap by finding something real that corresponds to what we think, as if, for example we imagine an elephant and then see an elephant which matches our image and proclaim our imagination objective, or if we think of words as representational or merely nominal and find some real corresponding correlation in our experience. Imagination and experience and thought and experience are different operations and the contents of the operations are different. How they get linked is another issue. It is not because they have something in common that we can denote via correspondence. The correspondence theory of truth we adumbrated above is an identity. We cannot claim that the same type

of identity holds between thought and experience. How we close that gap between thought and reality was discovered by Lonergan.

Lonergan and Reflective Understanding

The link is discovered in reflective understanding. Lonergan distinguishes reflective understanding, or reflective insight, from direct understanding. Direct insights occur as answers to what or why questions. Reflective understanding reveals the link between what we have understood directly with the sufficient reasons or evidence for accepting it as so. Reflective understanding occurs as the key event in the process leading from the question “Is it so?” to assent or denial, the unconditioned yes or no.

Central to his analysis is the notion of the virtually unconditioned. Something that is virtually unconditioned has conditions, but they are fulfilled. This is in contrast to the formally unconditioned, which exists without conditions, which is God. But as existing, the virtually unconditioned exists independently of the conditions which led to its existence. This gives the virtually unconditioned its unconditioned, or absolute, character. Anything which exists contingently is virtually unconditioned.

Judgments involve a virtually unconditioned. The simplest illustration is the deductive inference. If A, then B. But A. Therefore B. B is the conditioned. The conditions that must be fulfilled to assent to B are A. Different kinds of judgments are distinguished in terms of what is conditioned, what are the fulfilling conditions and what provides the link between the conditioned and the fulfilling conditions. The clearest case is the analytic judgment. Rules of meaning link the conditioned to its conditions. In

analytic judgments the ultimate conditions are the primary definitions that ground all deductions within the analytic set. However the link is realized in a reflective insight. A similar structure is found in concrete judgments of facts. The fulfilling conditions are present or remembered experience. The link is provided in the insight that the proposition you are entertaining is true on the basis of the particular experience you consider evidence.

Operationally, then, there are two key events. The first is the insight that recognizes the link. The second is the rational assent that follows this recognition. This assent is the "yes" in response to the question "is it so?" Since the assent follows from an insight, it cannot be willed. However, in complex judgments, ones with multiple conditions including beliefs, assent more readily can be withheld. But it cannot authentically be given at will. There would always be a nagging doubt to which one could attend if so inclined.

However, there is responsibility involved in judging. We can also say that something is not so, or that we do not know, or that we think something is probably true. We also can assert in the face of uncertainty. But this assertion is not always backed by assent. The situation appears more complicated when we consider that judgments rest on other judgments. Also, in judgments of matters of fact there is an nonsystematic set of judgments, which can condition one another in complex ways. Judgments, then, occur in contexts, and the truth of your judgment can be conditioned by the truth of your context. Thus, for Lonergan, there is a more fundamental structure of the linking of conditions to the unconditioned, the criterion of no further relevant questions. This link is recognized in an insight that one has reached mastery of a situation or a field of knowledge.

Since this criterion is of further relevant questions, not simply questions that occur to me, there is a necessity for genuineness if one is to know truly and completely. This genuineness takes two forms. The first is openness to new questions that challenge your mastery of an area. These can be more or less anxiety provoking depending on the situation. The second is more difficult. It is openness to questions you may have, but do not acknowledge. The explicit emergence of these questions for us can rest on a number of factors. We may not be able to adequately formulate them given our current state of knowledge. We may not want to answer them for some reason. There may be some form of resistance based on a psychological, individual, group or general bias. While individual bias favors me over others and group bias is favoring of one group over another, general bias is the rejection or devaluing of other types of specialized knowledge, such as science, scholarship or the expertise of technicians in favor of one's own. Other's knowledge may be considered impractical, irrelevant or both. The more difficult biases are the psychological where there is an inhibition of the images, thoughts and emotions that would lead to further understanding and judgment that would resolve personal intersubjective issues which in turn have implications for what one considers to be the case. This inhibition can be partial or virtually total and may require intervention via therapeutic techniques to resolve. It needs to be distinguished from lack of development. It also needs to be distinguished from inappropriate behavior, recurrent cycles of obsessive thought and action and so on which have their basis in biological conditions rather than the vicissitudes of development. Of course these also have an impact on development that can require therapeutic intervention to resolve. How performative failure and achievement intertwine in personal development and the import for

understanding psychology will be discussed in a later chapter.

It is rare that one masters a field or situation through knowledge alone. There is also a mixture of belief. This again raises the question of responsibility. One key to belief is that responsibility is involved in the decision to believe someone. We typically believe those who share our values. This is relatively transparent when we are younger and do not have the critical context to evaluate what our parents and others tell us. But it clearly becomes the case when we can think for ourselves. Since a belief can be a fulfilling condition for a judgment, the implications of changing who we believe can change our beliefs with implications radiating through our viewpoints.

Values also permeate judging. There is one kind of influence through beliefs since our choice of who to believe is often motivated by value. However values can also direct our knowing by conditioning the questions in which we are interested and the extent to which we will pursue them.

The immediately preceding account lays out in a schematic way Lonergan's notion of remote and proximate criteria for judging or for truth. The proximate criteria are the fulfilling conditions for the individual judgment. The remote are the context in which the judgement occurs. The effectiveness of the individual judging is contingent on the context since the individual judgement is situated within it. Thus Lonergan characterizes Heidegger's theory of truth as regarding the remote criterion. Though their notions of authenticity and inauthenticity differ, there is some affinity indicated in Lonergan's claim that objectivity is authentic subjectivity.

Modes of Knowing and the Appropriation of Truth

For Lonergan there are multiple modes of knowing, but for simplicity we will focus on three, common sense, science, and philosophy. With respect to science, we will compare judgments and knowledge in natural science with those in a science of consciousness.

While it is up to the ethnologists, anthropologists, psychologists, neurologists, philosophical anthropologists and evolutionary scientists among others to explain the effect of our animal heritage on our human knowledge, values and behavior, we do know that common desires, fears and anxieties channel behavior in types of situations. Though my fundamental disposition in a crisis may be significantly different from yours, the fact is that I have one and it is conditioned to some extent by my biology and psychology in a complex symbiosis with my development in a culture. As situated vitally my knowing occurs in a context conditioned by my desires and values. Spontaneously, then, common sense is subject to the vicissitudes of polymorphic consciousness. The desire to know is in the service of other desires.

Common sense spontaneously regards concrete situations in the context of living. It is not concerned primarily with the general or systematic as is science and philosophy, but with getting things done, getting along socially and so on. The role of knowing is implicit for the most part approximating Heidegger's account of the ready to hand, Merleau-Ponty's account of the implicit cogito and much of the scope of Newman's illiative sense. Knowing can be in the service of other desires following in some cases a logic of mixed desires rather than one of consistency where one's judgments and expressions are understood in terms of what one wants, rather than what one says. In

contrast, ideally, the scientist and philosopher give free rein to their pure desire to know where their questions, understanding and judging are not influenced by other desires and ends, but remain focused on fully answering the questions that arise one after another as inquiry progresses towards mastery. Though common sense alone may spontaneously be more prone to bias in knowing because the person has not learned the various methods of inquiry associated with professional practices and scientific disciplines, this is not what distinguishes common sense from science.

Common sense is not consistently normative as science aspires to be. While there may be consistency in parts of common sense knowing, overall it is not systematic, nor does it try to be. Science, on the other hand tends towards univocal terms fixed in relations consistent with one another. Common sense is as methodical as it needs to be to get the job done while science finds its cumulative success in its socially accepted method.

In doing science or philosophy the person is virtually in a different world from that intended by common sense. Rather than intending my vital situation I may be trying, for no practical purpose, to understand atoms or other entities and relations not given in my experience. Common sense and science may regard the same things, but they do so in different ways and with different values.

For the most part they also regard different types of relationships. Common sense regards things in terms of how they relate within my vital situation. Lonergan expresses this in terms of relations to us, but this is not quite accurate. We will understand this when we discuss the thing in itself. Science and philosophy can regard things in their relationships to one another. In this case, unless I am considering myself within my area

of inquiry, the scientist or philosopher are not significant. Now this does not mean that they are not significant within the knowing situation, but that they are not significant in the terms of what is known. They are not the object of interest. In contrast, common sense approximates Heidegger's notion of being in the world where everything has some reference to the for-the-sake-of-which that is *dasein*.

In the human sciences the person is part of the subject matter. Explanation does not exclude persons, but enriches our understanding of them. In sociology for example, my understanding of my situations can be helpful, but I may understand the statistical relations among multiple people in multiple situations many of which I may not have personally experienced. So the distinction between common sense and science holds here also.

In philosophy however, as we saw with Husserl's notion of eidetic insight into conscious operations, it is possible for insight into the concrete to yield general relationships and to relate conscious operations to one another, though Husserl characterized his results as descriptive rather than explanatory. Lonergan lays out a cognitional structure that begins with questions for intelligence answered by insights and proceeds to the process of reflective understanding and judging to determine if the insights are true. He complements it with a structure for responsible decision making where we get insights into possible actions, evaluate alternatives, make a choice and act. He finds insight operative at every stage of human knowing and doing where the differences in the types of insight are determined by the differences in the types of questions. As we saw with Newman and his pattern of questions and answers leading to assent, the process builds on itself. For example, in factual knowing, what is experienced

is what is questioned and understood. The understanding is of the experience. What is judged is what is understood.

These operations are conscious, so we also experience them. Thus it is possible for the operations to regard themselves so that we can understand understanding and judge whether our understanding is true. Likewise, we can understand judgment and then determine if our understanding of judgment is true. This entails judgments about judgment. The relating of these operations to one another is explanatory. Rather than us dropping out of the equation, we become different for ourselves through knowing ourselves. The implicit cogito becomes explicit, but not completely so. The spontaneity of intelligence and reasonableness can be so complex that we cannot grasp all the operations that occur in coming to a particular judgment. We would need to do a rational reconstruction of a series of prior operations to do so. (This is done to a certain extent in therapy which aims for a partial rational reconstruction in focusing on key memories, interpretations, judgments and decisions). So as in sports, knowing what to do provides precepts, but not total clarity and control. But as we develop, we can learn more about what fosters the achievement of insight and responsible decisions providing a methodical accumulation of intelligibility and knowledge and a greater probability of attaining what we value. At the core of this methodical process is a model to be applied, but the application is of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility where we can be more acutely aware of when we are not meeting the exigency of questions driving us to the next stage of achievement and can critically evaluate if we actually have attained it.

There are then, at least two major existential moments we can find in Lonergan. The first is the appropriation of truth.

To appropriate a truth is to make it one's own. The essential appropriation of truth is cognitional. However, our reasonableness demands consistency between what we know and what we do; and so there is a volitional appropriation of truth that consists in our willingness to live up to it, and a sensitive appropriation of truth that consists in an adaptation of our sensibility to the requirements of our knowledge and our decisions.²¹

There is a choice to live in the truth, though this typically is seamless and implicit unless we are confronted with situations where denial has some perceived value. But there also is a transformation that needs to occur to integrate what we know within our sensitive spontaneity. This also is seamless and implicit unless there is some issue. As we learn different things we are transformed. As our learning requires different orientations and skills we become more flexible in our dealings with the world.

The second is the process of self-appropriation. In general, this is a process of living within the truth of what we are. The process is similar to the general appropriation of truth, but can be more problematic. Psychological issues and the possibility of divergence from our self image, social norms and our culture can make seemingly simple operations major events. These issues revolve around meaning and value. More particularly, there is the appropriation of our conscious operations where they become meaningful for us as they are in themselves, and this model serves as a guide for present

performance and future development. For Lonergan this is the explicit implementation of a heuristic structure which at the highest philosophical level yields a metaphysics.

Philosophy as Factual

With the development of statistics and multiple models of mathematics the sway of the notion of truth as universal, necessary and certain knowledge was steadily eroded during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Science shifted from being knowledge to being primarily theoretical, mathematics shifted from the ideal of deductive system based firmly on self-evident principles to multiple systems which cannot provide their own foundations and natural laws were replaced by statistical regularities. Husserl can be seen as the last major philosophical figure who retained this ideal of truth. It provided the foundations for philosophy indirectly. For example, rather than claiming that perception is what it is universally and necessarily as some type of metaphysical principle, he claims that *it cannot be thought of* other than as perspectival. As we have seen, the bases for this conclusion are two: the primordial dator intuitions of immanent experience and the eidetic imaginal variation that yields no other way to understand perception. The promise of phenomenology is to secure the same level of apodictic knowledge with respect to all conscious operations that can be analyzed in terms of immanence. Analogous to the application of the Kantian categories, this would provide a set of ideas which could be applied to facts so we would know what they were. Simply put, any time we identified an instance of perception we would know that it was perspectival. So the universality and necessity does not apply to the fact that perception

²¹ Lonergan, *Insight: A Study In Human Understanding*, pages 581-582.

exists. This is contingent. Rather it pertains to what perception is. This is in contrast to the transcendent which is effectively “put together” or synthesized. There is nothing in one particular experience of a transcendent thing that points necessarily to another aspect of that thing which is not given. Instead, the experience of the transcendent has an intrinsic indeterminacy.

At this point we can understand why phenomenology is considered to be descriptive rather than explanatory. Its basis is found in what is immediately given, the immanent experiences. To discover a relationship among immanent experiences is to discover something which is given in neither alone. Since the experiences are separate, it cannot be given in both together. In fact, the relationship is not given at all, but discovered. With the notion of the immanent as grounding phenomenology, Husserl is pushed into the one to one relationship between description and experience that the immediate relationship between the immanent and its essence seems to demand. Heidegger provides support for this point when he says:

...the full content of the apriori of intentionality can be apprehended in simple commensuration with the matter itself. Such a directly seeing apprehension and accentuation is traditionally called *description*.
*Phenomenology's mode of treatment is descriptive.*²²

We saw earlier that the notion of description in general is problematic within both explanatory and scientific standpoints and will provide some additional analysis below.

²² Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, page 78

Lonergan decisively shifts philosophical justification from universal and necessary truths, with their seemingly guaranteed certainty, to facts. The notion of fact can be approached by asking the question “What is affirmed in judgment?” It is what is understood. With respect to matters of fact, what is understood is something that also is experienced. So as known, facts combine experience, understanding and judgment. If we are to be objective, facts need to be independent of knowing. There are two senses in which they are. First, in explanations that relate things to one another the person may or may not be one of the relata. Second in all cases, even those including the person, the conditions for knowing are not the conditions for the existence of the known. Thus, affirmation by the knower is factual and self-transcendent.

While we find the outlines of the structure of judgment in Newman with assent and the grounds for assent, as we noted it was for Lonergan to close the gap between them by discovering the act of reflective insight that is the recognition of the fulfillment of the conditions. This knowledge is both conscious and of consciousness. It also is factual rather than universal or necessary. How can factual knowledge provide the type of grounds previously sought in philosophy for developing a science of mind? The answer is that it cannot. Factual knowledge is fallible knowledge.

This does not mean that we cannot attain certainty. It means that we attain certainty as a matter of fact. Lonergan approaches the notion of certainty through the notion of vulnerable and invulnerable insights. A vulnerable insight is one where there are further relevant questions to be answered. An invulnerable insight is one where the questions have been answered. The gap between the vulnerable and the invulnerable insight is closed by the self-correcting process of learning. Thus, it is possible that we are

wrong in our initial formulations of the insight and that these shortcomings are exposed as we understand more and integrate our original insight into an increasingly complex and systematic context. Lonergan claims that what Husserl achieves via eidetic intuition are invulnerable insights. In general we can see the first phase in the eidetic intuition that grasps the necessity of perception being perspectival. This is the achievement of understanding. The second phase is reflective. Is there another way that perception could be? This is the question posed for imaginative eidetic variation which leads to the judgment that there is no other way that perception can be imagined. If it cannot be otherwise, then there are no further relevant questions and the conditions for final assent that all perception is perspectival are met.

Science undergoes the self-correcting process of learning in a social context in the historical revision of theories. Concepts that were key to earlier theories move to the periphery in later ones or, like phlogiston, disappear altogether. Yet there is a core of intelligibility that remains in the broader explanations of the empirical data as the newer theory explains what the older one did and more.

If this type of revision occurs in the empirical sciences, why does it not recur in the account of cognitional structure? Well, to some extent it does. While philosophy does not exhibit the steady progress of science, there have been significant developments in the theory of knowledge throughout the centuries. Lonergan admits that his position is reached by degrees through the self-correcting process of learning and that, once attained, can still be developed in its details. But his point is that he has hit the mark with the general structure as a matter of fact. How does he justify this and what are the implications for a theory of consciousness that follow from his justification?

There is the first notion of knowing a fact, which, we recall, involves experience, understanding and judgment. However, in the physical sciences experience becomes less significant as theory becomes predominant. Moreover, the theory can be of unimaginable relations of things to one another. The things themselves can be unimaginable as we prescind from our sensitive or experiential relations to them so that we can understand, not their relations to us, but their relations to one another. This sets up two virtually permanent reasons for scientific judgments always being probable and for the ongoing revision that results. The first is factual and the second logical. The factual one regards the complexity of scientific explanations, the number of outstanding scientific questions and the high probability that a series of developing explanations will be required where basic terms and relations in one set do not remain in subsequent sets.

The question is whether Lonergan has arrived at an adequate explanation. He argues that he has in his discussion of the impossibility of revision of the position on knowing. While this involves us in the sort of entanglements that resulted in both Descartes and Husserl claiming an absolute necessity for the truth, for Lonergan the necessity is conditional where the conditions are having the right set of facts.

His account of cognitional structure starts with questions for intelligence such as “What?” and “Why?” leading to insights which, if explanatory, relate things to one another. Achieving understanding leads to another round of questioning with the core question being “Is it so?” The answer to this is given in the assent or denial of judgment, which we indicated earlier follows from the reflective insight that the conditions for judgment have been met. Clearly, this very schematic account can be developed further. But our point is to lay out Lonergan’s argument regarding the irrevisability of his

explanation of knowing. That is, that if we were to revise it, we would need to ask questions for intelligence, have insights and then make judgments. So the attempt at revision, would really be a form of confirmation. The point is not that knowing cannot be other than it is, for different accounts of knowing about. The point is that this is what it in fact is and that it is up to us to understand our own understanding and judging and then judge that understanding of ourselves and see what we end up with. The result is for him the self-affirmation of the knower. It is up to each individual to personally understand and verify the pattern. So just as the periodic table is an effective model in the understanding of chemistry, the theory of cognitional structure can be an effective explanatory model that is part of a science of consciousness. Just as it is conceivable that the periodic table could be replaced in future chemical theory, so it is conceivable that knowing could be something other than the current account of it. However, just as we would not toss out the periodic table because our knowledge is both incomplete and merely factual, so we can accept a theory of knowledge in its broad outlines that becomes a model from which we can develop more knowledge of consciousness and knowing.

The Thing in Itself

Kant claimed that we could not know the thing in itself. We know the individual via intuition. Since our intuition is only empirical we cannot know the intelligible as individual. The thing in itself for Kant is that of which we can have no empirical intuition. The thing for us is that of which we can have an empirical intuition. But that intuition relativizes the thing in terms of our intuitive capacities. Since understanding is universal and abstracts from the particular, the particular cannot be given in

understanding. It is only through empirical intuition that we know the particular. Hence, we cannot know the thing in itself because we cannot have an intelligible intuition of it as particular. We only can know it negatively as a fully indeterminate X which is, somehow, related to appearances.

While Lonergan accepts the distinction between the thing for us and the thing in itself, but he thinks both are knowable. We will discuss his position shortly. In phenomenology and existentialism they try to resolve the problem of the thing for us and the thing in itself by collapsing the distinction.

Husserl's view of the thing in itself, though not fully complete, is a major advancement from Kantian thought and could easily correct many naturalistic and epistemological misconceptions in current philosophies. The thing in itself for Kant is the unknown X which is, in a sense, behind appearances and is partially their cause. It cannot be known in itself because we cannot, in principle, have an empirical intuition of it as it is in itself. For Husserl, the thing in itself is precisely that of which we have empirical intuitions. The notion that we do not is based on a view of experience as representative of, analogous to a sign of, the thing in itself. The notion of a sign requires two acts of perceiving where in the perception of a thing there is only one. The first is the perception of the sign and the second is the perception of that which the sign indicates. The sign itself is a qualitatively different type of thing than that which it signifies. Likewise, representation implies that the same thing can be given to us in two different ways. (This argument is analogous to his, Heidegger's and Brentano's critique of the correspondence theory of truth.) Part of the problem for Husserl is that things are given in two different ways, but they are conflated by those who do not think we

experience things in themselves. These two ways are empirical and formal intuition. The content of formal intuition is unimaginable. Since the scientific understanding of the thing in itself in physics and chemistry is to a large extent mathematical, the thing in itself is interpreted as an absolute that is not given in experience. Rather, experience, as caused by physiological and psychic processes is subjective and a “distorting” or relativizing of the thing in itself. Hence, it is merely appearance where the notion of appearance is that of appearance of ... where the of ..., due to the essential nature of appearance, is not given as such. This implicitly reduces the essential to the level of the experience, a tacit error which is compounded by trying to imagine essences.

In fact, as Husserl’s analysis of perception shows, the experiential already is transcendent. For him this is the field that science tries to explain by understanding the connections among experiences. Science both starts from experience in it’s questioning and returns to it for verification, or, more generally, it emerges from and returns to the life world. The Kantian noumenon, then, is found in the phenomenon, and Husserl can claim that Phenomenology is a return to the things themselves.

While Husserl’s understanding is more parsimonious, concrete and reflective of scientific understanding than the “objectivist” view of the thing in itself, he in fact makes the complementary error of not considering scientific knowledge and reality as absolute since it is not immanent, primordial or pure, immediate and certain. Its justification is ultimately reduced to immanence and the essences of immanence. It also is secondary to the life world in which it has a valuable but limited predictive role. In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology he strikes a positivistic stance.

This actually intuited, actually experienced and experienceable world, in which practically our whole life takes place, remains unchanged as what it is, in its own essential structure and its own concrete causal style, whatever we may do with or without techniques. Thus it is also not changed by the fact that we invent a particular technique, the geometrical and Galilean technique which is called physics. What do we actually accomplish through this technique? Nothing but prediction extended to infinity.²³

Now the reality is that these views need to be reconciled. The transcendent, to be fully transcendent, must exist absolutely. It must exist in itself and not merely in relation to consciousness. The failure to explain this rests in an incomplete distinction of the conditions for knowing, which explains the transcendent in relation to consciousness, and knowing, with the conditions for the existence of the transcendent. His notion of being as absolute and relative to consciousness is a distinction within knowledge, of being as known, not in itself. It is the failure to fully work out and reconcile these two views which legitimates interpretations of Husserl as an idealist, though he acknowledged that the factual sciences are of a reality that is pre-existent and independent of our existence. His notions of judgment and of truth are limiting conditions in attaining an adequate explanation of the transcendent.

Partly this is dictated by the role that immanence plays in grounding the foundations of the transcendent. The transcendent is constituted fundamentally in terms of the immanent. The conditions for knowing reality become conflated with the conditions for the constitution of reality for us, which is idealism. With existentialism we

²³ Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences*, page 51.

find a corresponding inability to fully transcend ourselves since the horizon for being is the temporality of consciousness or *dasein*. But if in fact the link between the conditions and the conditioned in judgment is not given by the peculiarity of the data, that is, its immanence or the being given all at once of intuition, then a reality can be affirmed where the conditions for its being are not the same as the conditions for knowing it, and the potential horizon of consciousness becomes commensurate with the knowable.

What does this mean? Reality is the knowable. There is more to reality than what we know at any time, the unknown, but we know that. The unknown is for us, exists for us, insofar as we know it as unknown. It exists potentially for us, insofar as we anticipate it as knowable. We anticipate it in our questions. As questioned, the unknown is the to-be-known.

We contend that this issue disappears in a fully explanatory account. In general we are considering three theoretically differentiated viewpoints, the naturalistic, the phenomenological and the fully explanatory. The first is explanatory, but not interior. The second is interior and only implicitly explanatory. The third is interior and fully explanatory in intent. They correspond to fundamental orientations. The first is based on an extroverted model of knowing. The second is based on intentionality. The third is based on the intellectual pattern of experience *per se*. Again, the first primarily regards the relations of things to us; the second the relation of us to things; the third the relation of things to one another. The first focuses on sense data and sensibly based observations as the primary form of our relation to being, the second on the data of consciousness as immanent in Husserl's sense and the third on data of sense and consciousness, but also symbolic thought and expression. Why the reliance on symbols or signs?

Considering the thing for us and the thing in itself we see that there are three options regarding the relations of the thing in itself to observation. The first case is where we can observe things in themselves, but we know they exist independently of our observing in particular and our experience in general. We can understand some of them independently of their relations to us or to any consciousness. In the second case, the thing in itself does not exist independently of experience, because it is experience in some sense. This is the immanence of consciousness. The third is that the thing in itself is not observable. In this case we can have data regarding it, but we do not have any “direct” experience of it.

How is it possible to know something we do not directly experience? Given that observations are interpreted in some sense, that is, that they are observations of “something”, distinguishing the observable from the unobservable becomes problematic, for how would we know that something was unobservable if we could not “observe” it in some way? We can resolve this issue by relating observation to what we experience immediately to data which can be related to what we do not experience. Thus, I observe the movement of the needle on a seismograph which I interpret as data indicating that there is an earthquake, though I do not observe the earthquake in the sense of experiencing it via any of its effects other than the movement of the needle.

Now the earthquake is not unobservable. In this instance, it simply is not observed. But there are things and events which are unobservable in that we are related to them only through our understanding of data, which, as observed, is a mediated manifestation or effect of the thing or event. Atoms, for example, are too small to be seen with the naked eye, but we do have various pictures of them. An atom is an

example of a known unobservable. But we also can postulate reasonably a set of unknown unobservables which will eventually become known through their relations to current or future observables or unobservables.

Because science deals with unobservables (though, of course, not exclusively), the rise of science has been matched by technological developments which have enabled discovery and verification. The development of scientific theory includes understanding the methodological role of instruments, a role which is related to the intelligibility of what is being studied. The understanding explains why the “observed” is “data”.

Why the dependence on signs? Insight requires images. Whereas initial insights are into the intelligibility immanent in images, the more recondite are into the intelligibility related to signs. In the case of signs, there already is an intelligibility for us which may or may not be conceptualized. Using the clearest example, in cases where it is conceptualized, the subsidiary manipulation of signs in trying to understand the undiscovered implications of what we already understand or know exploits the imaginal in conditioning the emergence of insights. Mathematics is the clearest example. Thus there can be a spontaneous attempt to make our concepts consistent with one another. When we are conceiving, we may not be satisfied with our formulation of the insight until it is consistent with what we already understand or know. Once we understand logic, we can recognize that a scientific theory, in its term, needs to be consistent and make that a principle for accepting additions to a paradigm or a theory. This renders greater control of meaning. Thus, Galileo accepted as a scientific principle that the mathematical implications of the mathematical relationships discovered and confirmed via experiments and observations were themselves hypotheses that needed to be verified

and that we would expect to become verified given the truth of the prior discoveries.

Formal relations can suggest plausible hypotheses.

Though numbers may not be particulars themselves, they do provide a means for understanding the interrelationships of particulars as such, whether we want to understand these as things, qualities, measurements, or most generally, *relata*. It makes no difference mathematically if the particulars are observable or not. Thus, the use of mathematics makes possible the reasonable postulation of unobservable things and events and provides a means for understanding their interrelationships. Moreover, it provides a means for understanding them independently of sensing since we can move beyond the observations to understanding the relations which explain the observations. In some sense the observations are given. The relations, on the other hand, are discovered and then conceptualized mathematically. They are verified via measurable observations. In the human sciences they can be verified via theoretically informed, or defined, data.

The remote possibility of a science of the unimaginable and the reality for us of things and events we cannot in principle experience rests on the cognitional fact that verification in knowledge of facts relies on observation which in turn relies on someone's immediate experience, but that discovery does not. Now, we can have insight into our immediate experience. However, when we have insight into our immediate experience once we live in a world mediated by meaning, it is insight into an experience for which there is a meaningful context. So the insight can be into more than the experience. The meaningful context is matched by language and other skills we utilize to understand. It is more common to have insights into what we imagine. This means we are not restricted to reality being empirically given. *Instead, we are restricted in knowledge of facts to reality*

being empirically verified. To say that reality is potentially knowable is to say that it is, for us, potentially intelligible. It is actually intelligible for us insofar as we know it.

Explanations are one mode of grasping intelligibility.

The Possibility of a Science of Consciousness as Personally Experienced

We have discussed the differences in fulfilling conditions between immanentism and critical realism. We also have discussed the differences in horizons that issue from those differences. It remains to understand the differences in the nature of consciousness. This can best be approached by understanding why phenomenology is descriptive, critiquing the notion of description in general and then understanding a different model of consciousness as intelligible that issues from the fact that it can be explained.

When we asked why phenomenology is descriptive we found that it stems partly from the notion of truth. Truth, as self-evidence, cuts two ways. Not only is it evident to me, but it is evident in itself, it shows itself. That it is self showing grounds the objectivity of knowledge since its existence is not dependent on me, the knower, the subject, or, more problematically, for Heidegger, *dasein*. If we try to explain what shows itself in terms of what does not appear immediately as does naturalism, we lose the fundamental experience that grounds the notion of things in themselves. In a peculiar way, we think ourselves out of existence. Both Brentano and Dilthey give credence to explanatory psychology, but they find the fundamental phenomena that a naturalistic psychology would try to explain in consciousness. Merleau-Ponty refines this in the Primacy of Perception. Husserl develops the argument to the fullest distinguishing a

psychology that would consider consciousness as it would a thing in the world versus a phenomenology that demonstrates that consciousness is the fundamental ground of all sciences, including psychology.

As with other scientific theories, the fulfilling conditions for judgment would be established by the theory. Thus, for an account of consciousness as experienced we can rely on first person observations. Penfield did so as he stimulated nerve cells in the brain of epilepsy patients during operations. They would give an account of what they were experiencing: memories, tastes and so on. We can rely on our own experience as Lonergan proposes in his series of insights into insight. Lastly we could surmise that someone understood something by observing their behavior assuming they are being genuine in their expression.

To summarize then, there is nothing privileged about consciousness that makes knowledge of consciousness more certain than other kinds of knowledge or knowledge of other kinds of things. Likewise, there is nothing about the experience of consciousness that limits the types of scientific judgments we can make about it. Rather, knowledge of consciousness is like other scientific knowledge. The judgments are judgments of fact and the understanding is explanatory. Description plays a role, but the role it plays is that of providing data, offering both material to be understood and the confirming instances required for knowing.

What are the implications of this discussion for the understanding of mind? In essence that is the topic of this book. But at this point we can draw some initial conclusions about the nature of consciousness and the contribution that philosophy can make to a science of consciousness. A first point is that consciousness is intelligible. In

the clearest case this follows from the fact that explanatory understanding discovers intelligible relations. As we are conscious of our understanding so we are conscious of the relations intelligently. The existence of the relations for us is intentional. That is, if what we have understood is true, then the intelligibility is real. But its reality is the reality of what is understood, not the reality of the understanding. The distinction between the knower and the known is established operationally (versus fully reflectively) in the judgment where the conditions for knowing x are not the conditions for the being of x. The distinction is established fully reflectively in an adequate theory of judgment.

At this point we will consider only the fact that consciousness can be implicitly intelligible in its operations. This certainly has implications for a theory of spirituality, but they cannot be discussed until we understand the embodiment of mind. But the “operative hypothesis” is that the emergence of intelligibility for us is via understanding. The achievement of understanding is via insight into images or sensitive experience. If this is so, then we would seem to be limited again by the range or limits of our experience and imagination. However, if we are to know things in themselves that we cannot experience, there must be some way of overcoming this limitation. It is done via symbols and for the most part via language. The relations between intelligibility and meaning will be discussed in the next chapter. But the key is that language gives us to the ability to imaginatively manipulate meaning leading to insights into the relationships of purely intelligible relata.

Now the preceding has focused on the notion of the thing in itself that we do not experience. If we shift to explanatory understanding of consciousness, then we are dealing with understanding the thing in itself that we do experience. Earlier we alluded

to the fact that the former type of understanding becomes more abstract with imaginal and sensible correlates playing a subsidiary role, while in the latter type of understanding, they can be related themselves. In this self-understanding we become more concrete for ourselves. There is a profound personal element involved. Opening and moving into the horizon of the personal is where the existentialists excelled. But we need to situate that within the broader horizon of being. The issue is seen most clearly in understanding sensation or perception.

We have pointed out that sensitivity is limited because it is selective. We do not see via infrared light waves as do dogs for example. We also saw that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities rested on the fact that sensitivity is a bio-psychological mediation of whatever the sensory “input” is, photons, sound waves, biochemicals in smell and so on. This mediation meant that what was spontaneously given sensitively was not the thing in itself in itself, but as, to try to make a tautology meaningful, mediated. This mediation led to the potential of “subjectivizing” the thing in itself leading to unobjective knowledge of it. Sensitive illusions such as the fact that a stick looks bent when it is partly in the water were pointed to as evidence of this. While this is certainly important when one is understanding physics and chemistry, what comes to the fore when we are understanding biology and psychology is that sensitivity is a type of organizing in itself that can be studied for its own sake. The sensitive world, the world of immediacy, is a “world” in its own right.

Using this as an analogy, we can understand Husserl’s contribution in making consciousness itself a region of being and Heidegger’s expansion of phenomenology to the multiple primordial structures of being in the world. The world for us becomes a

“world” or realm of being in its own right. The issue is situating that world within being as such, or the “world in itself”. Our thesis is that to do so, we need an explanatory account of that world and that in fact, this is what existentialism was doing implicitly, though for them it was some combination of Phenomenology or hermeneutics. To understand this, we need to understand how the answer to a “What?” question can be explanatory. That is, if we understand what something is in the fullest sense, we explain it. Explaining is largely a matter of understanding relations and these abound in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Being-in-the-world is articulated. It is structured as various modes of dasein’s being. These modes are related to one another as authentic or inauthentic and then re-understood within the theory of temporality. Just as we saw that Husserl had to be explanatory to get us to the point of understanding immanence, so Heidegger is highly systematic in getting us to pay attention to what shows itself in itself. The case of Merleau-Ponty is more to the point, because he incorporates scientific explanations within his explanatory resolutions of philosophical issues.

Philosophy can contribute to a science of consciousness then by shifting from being implicitly explanatory to being explicitly explanatory and factual. This does not mean that its method becomes the same as scientific method, but that it is compatible with it because its results are. Philosophy makes a complementary contribution.

Part of this contribution is in the form of existential explanations. Succinctly put, an explanation is existential if we are explaining our participation in situations, the world, the universe and so on. There is an existential element in the fact that participation involves freedom. There is a greater existential element in that we need to become more involved in our participation to understand it. Trying to understand it changes our degree and type of

involvement. There is still a greater existential element in affirming the explanation as true because it may be contrary to our values, self image and other judgments requiring a revision of these to enable the affirmation. This can be major and then it takes on characteristics of a conversion experience or it can be minor. As minor there still can be significant accommodations we need to make which differ from the refinements we make in fine tuning or developing a preexistent viewpoint. There is a final existential moment in choosing to live consistently in terms of the new intelligibility where we include these changes in values in the choices we make. Thus, existential explanation is transformative. Now knowing always changes the knower. But existential explanation changes the involvement of the person in its genesis and has the potential for greater personal change since the person becomes different for themselves. Existential explanation can yield both personal and scientific development.

The broad outlines of this type of personal development can be understood by recourse to Hegel's notions of the for itself and the in itself. What we are in ourselves is what we really are. What we are for ourselves is how we experience, understand and know ourselves to be. There are two types of gaps between the two that developing self knowledge progressively closes. The first is that I do not completely know myself. Developing self knowledge makes the gap smaller, but it does not go away. In one sense the continuance of the gap is not a matter of principle, but of achievement, since there is more to know than we can achieve in a lifetime. In a second sense it is a matter of principle, or human nature, since we are developing and come to know what we are after the fact of becoming what we are. The closest we get to closing this gap is to understand ourselves as

we are becoming ourselves. Yet due to the complexity of our operations, this knowledge, though sometimes relatively immediate, typically is incomplete.

The second type of gap is error. I may think I understand or know myself, but I am wrong. Closing this gap is more difficult since issues of authenticity typically are involved. I may be wrong about myself because I simply made a mistake. However, I also may be wrong or consistently resist knowing aspects of myself because of conflicts, issues or desires that I do not want to admit. The need to address authenticity, another major existential theme, is a key to arriving at adequate existential explanations. It needs to be addressed both personally and theoretically.

Reconciling Explanation and Phenomenological Description

The reconciliation of the explanatory and phenomenological viewpoints can only occur explanatorily. In fact, Husserl's reduction of the transcendent to the immanent is an explanation of the transcendent in relation to the immanent and vice versa. Husserl acknowledges the former but not the latter because explanation for him is not primordial but mediate. His emphasis on essence and universal possibilities led him to reject genetic accounts of knowing as fundamental. A complete theory of human knowing would be in terms of the material and operational conditions for its emergence as well as its structure. Knowing would be placed in the universe where things are related to one another. Reconciliation of the causal with the "formal" understanding of knowing would occur in providing an adequate model for understanding emergence and the relation between mind and brain. This also would reconcile the natural and human sciences with one another

and both with philosophy, as complementary with one another. It also would provide the basis for understanding hermeneutics in its proper interpretative role, situating the linguistic interpretation of meaning within the broader context of human understanding as insight and language within its full pragmatic context.

This, I think, is a noble project, but it is precisely the project that phenomenology and existentialism reject. The rejection is based on a failure to understand how being for us and being in itself, or the thing for us and the thing in itself, can be understood within a single, explanatory, transcendental viewpoint that accounts for the universe of being as explained. This would include a concrete, factual, and personal understanding of conscious operations and horizons, which would be subsumed within the broader explanatory framework. Husserl failed to acknowledge the full explanatory scope of his own thought with the consequent failure to grasp that because one can explanatorily grasp transcendental relationships, one can just as well grasp others with similar legitimacy. More fundamentally, this requires a shift from essential to factual knowledge and a recognition that factual knowledge can be certain, though in principle, it can be wrong. It is a failure to understand that viewpoints do not have to be self centered, or, more to the point, that in many cases the intelligibility of X can be known without considering the relation of the knower to X. These would be clear cases of self-transcendence.

Knowledge is of the transcendent as absolute, and it is within a particular viewpoint because it is intentional. This is the heart of the “paradox” of self-transcendence. Judgment is simply the last increment in a process. The independence of the object (in the broad sense of object of questioning) is implicit in the understanding of

it, which need not include an understanding of the knower. It is “structural” or operational. Likewise, the question is put within a horizon in which what is questioned is constituted already as independent, or as a to-be-known, which, if known, would be independent. This also is operational and pre-reflective. The philosophical confusion occurs in knowing consciousness, because being for us and being in itself are coincidental in these instances. That is, there is an immediate relation to consciousness in itself via consciousness which corresponds to Husserl’s notion of immanence. The fuller relationship is knowledge of consciousness which is a self-mediation by the immediately given operations. We need to work through the issues of being-in-itself being for us without thinking that the meaning of being is to be related to consciousness. The resolution, again, is that the conditions for knowing and the conditions for being are different.

Once that is accepted, then there is no paradox in explaining the emergence of consciousness as intentional and autonomous. Autonomy would correspond to absoluteness in Husserl’s sense. It is by establishing the autonomy of consciousness that one refutes naturalism, which Husserl has done by understanding transcendental consciousness as having an irreducible role in providing and understanding evidence.

Critique of Phenomenological Description

Let us consider another critical issue. How immanent, immediate and certain is phenomenological description? The descriptive component of explicating how conscious operations are performed becomes explanatory if they are not in a continuous stream.

Then we need to relate separately experienced operations to one another, and this may require mediation. If we rely upon memory we lose certainty since memory can be incorrect even if the immanent incorrect memory cannot be doubted itself. Husserl's "constructivist" notion of the transcendental as based on immediate truth breaks down in its own account as phenomenological description becomes more structural and explanatory and less immediate and, consequently, is pushed to become factual in needing to empirically verify understanding on the basis of data that in principle can be incorrect, instead of having the understanding be given fully and certainly with reference to only the immediate immanent experience.

Two other points can be made. First, Husserl's account is, in many instances, neither universal nor necessary. Second, Husserl's questions and insights are conditioned by unacknowledged insights and judgments. The reductions, which prescind from judgments of fact, do not prescind from prior explicit understanding. Thus, they do not yield a presuppositionless context for inquiry. These points require further development elsewhere.

A final critical issue regards the selectivity of phenomenological attention and, derivatively, questioning. Immanent experiences may be self given, but the true experiential field is complex and attentiveness to it is selective. Now the attentive correlate is given along with attentiveness, and our insight may only be of that correlate. But how do we know that we have grasped the full meaning of the correlate? Its meaning may be subsumed within a more complex structure that is not given, but can only be understood through multiple insights into multiple immanent experiences which need to be related to one another in further insights. As understood within the structure its

meaning may be different than when understood in isolation, since the isolated instance was really partial. The structure, *per se*, is never fully present. Because it consists of multiple operations it cannot be given immediately. Moreover, its performance in any single actualization can be nonsystematic, historical, and discontinuous. It also may operate in multiple instances concurrently, some of which are unattended to in the attending selection of the original immanent correlate, and many of which are at different stages in the unfolding of the structure. Any 'description' of this process would be highly relational, or explanatory. Though an explanatory model can be developed by which the key operations can be described in the sense of laying out their ideal order, it would be misleading to describe this model as self given when it really is the result of complex mediate processes and when its application requires the complementary operations of having insights into particular instances which grasp the manners in which the model relates or fails to relate to experience. This is not to say that Husserl overlooks the complexity of consciousness and the difficulty in understanding it. In fact, in his understanding of complex sets of operations and the sedimentation of meaning, this is what he is moving towards, but his emphasis on the immediacy of absolute truth and meaning and their foundational role as certain in principle limits the process by cutting off factual explanation as a fruitful model. In explaining consciousness there is a transcendence of description where relationships are of prime importance. Just as the transcendent for Husserl is not fully present, so is the immanent in its intelligibility. Thus, in knowing consciousness there is a transcendence of the given and of essences that are grasped as understanding develops. This development is not merely of ideas becoming clearer and more complete, but of the discovery of relationships that are not

given and that do not exist in all possible, or conceivable, similar instances, but which account for intentional constitution of the real. In this sense, knowledge of the immanent is transcendent in the sense that it is complex and factual and that what is known is what it is independently of the particular knowing of it, even though that knowing may be of itself in act, or approximate an absolute identity. It is the failure of Twentieth Century philosophy to attain this level of understanding of the transcendent which accounts for the prevalent understanding of knowledge in terms of belief and decision. This level of understanding cannot be achieved unless understanding is explanatory.

Foundations

Philosophy, then, is not foundational in the sense of providing the grounds for the other sciences. One type of knowledge does not ground another. It can explain another, but it does not provide it with foundations since different types of knowing have their own evidence and modes of operation. Rather it is complementary. Philosophy can explain those modes of operation as adequate or inadequate self-transcendence, as knowing or opinion or belief, as authentic or inauthentic, as contributing to spiritual development or not, and so on. But philosophers should not dictate to scientists, for example. Rather our role is to resolve philosophical questions regarding science. The value for the scientist is that these questions will be encountered in doing science and the scientist will have somewhere to turn for assistance when they need to engage in philosophy just as we turn to science to understand what particular things and events and situations are. If we narrowly interpret foundations as the conditions for judgment, then,

since there are no privileged conditions for truth, foundations become defined in terms of function, or operations, rather than content, and we can reconcile the core of truth found in historicism, relativism, post modernism and so on resting on the rejection of foundations as formal with an absolute objectivity indeterminate in scope. We can agree with Merleau-Ponty regarding the indeterminacy of intentionality being analogous to the intrinsic indeterminacy, or incompleteness, of perceiving with its perspectives to be discovered. If we broaden the notion to all constitutive operations within a factual and contingent, rather than formal, context, we can incorporate the concerns of Husserl's phenomenology with the current emphasis on the concrete, contingent, nonsystematic and free.

A fuller inquiry would account for the unity of experience which Husserl equated with temporality. In a "self-deconstructing" statement in **Ideas**, which also foreshadows Heidegger, he says:

The transcendental "Absolute" that we have laid bare through the reductions is in truth not ultimate; it is something which in a wholly profound and unique sense constitutes itself, and has its primeval source in what is ultimately and truly absolute.²⁴

Perhaps its source is itself as emergent self-mediation. As emergent, its origins would be "concealed" since the conditions do not fully explain the emergent. Then the immediate always would be a mediated immediacy, where immediacy is relative to operations, and the Husserlian notions of truth, the immanent, and the absolute would need to be

rethought explanatorily, integrating spiritual operations with the biological and psychological conditions for the constitution of the “immediate”. That is the model we will present later

The Anglo-American tradition at one point was concerned with clarifying scientific concepts. In a similar way some phenomenology is concerned with clarifying the experiences which psychology tries to explain.²⁵ In contrast, we identify the psychological facts associated with resolution of philosophical issues, if in fact there are any. How is this different? Because philosophy determines what the meaning of truth is, not psychology. Psychologists cannot determine when one has achieved the truth if they do not know what it is. So the issue is not to clarify the psychologist’s concepts, but to supply the concepts which philosophy contributes that complement the psychological investigation. So there may be a psychology of truth, but we cannot get there without a notion of truth.

What is assented to is an explanation on the basis of a fulfillment conceived relationally where the link is discovered via insight, not through some intuitive act where it is given. It is one thing to have an experience of a verificatory instance and another to recognize it. This means that the nature of consciousness is not primordially self-evident. It can be intelligible. This means we can be both meaningful and complex where neither of these is apparent or given. Self knowledge becomes self discovery where we become for ourselves what we are in ourselves. At this point I will leave the discussion in that problematic realm.

²⁴ Husserl, *Ideas*, page 216.

²⁵ Merleau Ponty, *Primacy of Perception*, page 63.